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This paper extends the work of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) to the Baltic and
Central Eastern European future Member States of the European Union, to test if the
same short-run increase in cyclical volatility arising from financial integration is
observed in this specific sample of “emerging markets”. This work finds some signs
that, contrary to other emerging markets, this does not happen: for the future Member
States, financial integration, similarly to the outcome observed in mature market
economies, reduces cyclical volatility both in the short and in the long run. Weak
indications are found that this may happen partially due to the anchoring of expectations
provided by the EU Accession, and to the more robust institutional framework imposed
by this process onto the countries in question.
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The main aim of this paper is to extend the liberalization index developed by Kaminsky
and Schmukler, 2003 (K&S), for a specific sample of countries, namely, the previously
centrally planned economies from Central and Eastern Europe that became members of
the EU in 2004 (resp. will become in 2007), and to perform a similar analysis on them.
My results lend only weak support to the basic assumption of this study: a re-estimation
of K&S’s core regressions, using cycles defined by a Bry-Boschan algorithm, finds
some signs that financial liberalization does generate benefits both in the short and in
the long run, measured via the statistically significant extension of the amplitude of
upward cycles and the –statistically non-significant- reduction of downward cycles of
stock market indexes. Importantly, these estimated results diverge from K&S, as in their
work “emerging markets” experience a relative  increase in the amplitude of
downward cycles. Some of the weak results are likely related to the shortness and
specific features of the sample of countries.
Another noteworthy feature is that only minor liberalization reversals, led by the
financial sector component, were observed in the aggregate liberalization index. Also,
those reversals do not seem to be driven by “contagion” from shocks in other emerging
markets (like the Asian or Russian crisis), but reflect country-specific shocks, related to
temporary reactions to the several banking crisis observed in the region.
Concerning the importance of the EU Accession, the initial assumption of this paper
was that the positive results above would come about due to the anchoring of
expectation provided by the perspective of entry into the EU in 2004 (or 2007, in the
case of Bulgaria and Romania), and by the imposition of the more vigorous macro and
institutional framework required by the Accession process itself. Robust signs of this
are  found in the K&S regressions, perhaps because the liberalization index itself
captures the effects of the EU Accession process.
Finally, using a different framework than K&S’s to assess the affects of liberalization
on financial, real and nominal 	

, the results are similar to the previous ones, but
they seem to indicate that the 


 is the element that mostconsistently and significantly reduces volatility. One also observes significant time-
varying effects on the coefficients, as one should expect, given the nature of the series
used, but no non-linear effects of liberalization. On this section, the majority the





Das Hauptziel dieses Papiers ist es, den von Kaminsky und Schmukler (2003) (K&S)
entwickelten Liberalisierungindex für ein spezifisches Sample von Länder, nämlich die
früher zentral geplanten Wirtschaftssysteme von Zentral- und Osteuropa, die 2004 Mit-
glieder der EU geworden sind (oder 2007 werden sollen), zu erweitern und eine
ähnliche Analyse für diese Länder durchzuführen.
Meine Resultate unterstützen die grundlegende Annahme dieser Studie nur schwach:
eine Neuschätzung der Kernregression von K&S, deutet darauf hin, dass finanzielle
Liberalisierung sowohl kurz- als auch langfristig vorteilhaft ist; dies wird durch die
statistisch signifikante Verlängerung der Amplitude der Aufwärtszyklen und der -
statistisch nicht-signifikanten - Verringerung der Abwärtszyklen von Börsenindizes ge-
messen. Dagegen ist bei K&S in “emerging markets” eine relativ kurzfristige Zunahme
der Amplitude der Abwärtszyklen zu beobachten. Einige der Resultate hängen wahr-
scheinlich mit der Kürze und den spezifischen Eigenschaften des Samples von Ländern
zusammen.
Eine andere bemerkenswerte Eigenschaft ist, dass nur kleine Umkehrungen von
Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen im gesamten Liberalisierungindex beobachtet wurden.
Auch scheinen jene Umkehrungen nicht durch “Ansteckung”, d.h. ausgelöst von
Schocks in anderen “emerging markets” (wie die asiatische oder russische Krise), zu
entstehen, sondern sie reflektieren länderspezifische Schocks, meist temporäre Reaktio-
nen auf die in der Region selbst beobachteten Bankenkrisen.
Hinsichtlich der Bedeutung des EU Beitritts war die Ausgangsannahme dieses Papiers,
dass die obigen positiven Resultate sich aus der Festigung der Erwartungen aufgrund
der Perspektive des Beitritts in die EU in 2004 (oder 2007, im Fall von Bulgarien und
von Rumänien) erklären würden und aus der Auferlegung des strikteren makro-
ökonomischen und institutionellen Rahmens durch den Beitrittprozess selbst. Robuste
Anzeichen eines solchen Zusammenhangs werden in den Regressionen analog zu denen
von K&S nicht gefunden, möglicherweise weil der Liberalisierungindex selbst die
Effekte des EU Beitrittsprozesses erfasst.Mit einem anderen Analyseverfahren als dem von K&S, das verwendet wird, um den
Einfluss der Liberalisierung auf die finanzielle, reale und nominale Volatilität festzu-
stellen, werden ähnliche Resultate erzielt, aber sie scheinen zu zeigen, dass die
Liberalisierung der Kapitalverkehrsbilanz das Element ist, das durchweg signifikant die
Volatilität verringert. Es werden auch signifikante, mit der Zeit variierende Effekte auf
die Koeffizienten beobachtet, wie man sie aufgrund des Charakters der gegebenen Zeit-
reihe erwarten sollte, aber keine nicht-linearen Effekte der Liberalisierung. Auf Basis
dieser Analyse deutet die Mehrheit der ökonometrischen Resultate darauf hin, dass der
EU Erweiterungsprozess eine spezifische Rolle bei der Volatilität gespielt hat.

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Financial and capital flows’ liberalization can play a fundamental role in increasing
growth and welfare. Typically, emerging or developing economies seek foreign savings
to solve the inter-temporal savings-investment problem. On the other hand, current
account surplus countries seek opportunities to invest their savings. To the extent that
capital flows from surplus to deficit countries are well intermediated and, therefore, put
to the most productive use, they increase welfare.
1
Liberalization can, however, also be dangerous, as has been witnessed in many
past and recent financial, currency and banking crises. It can make countries more
vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In particular, if serious macroeconomic imbalances
exist in a recipient country, and if the financial sector is weak, be it in terms of risk
management, prudential regulation and supervision, large capital flows can easily lead
to serious financial, banking or currency crises. A number of recent crises, like those in
East Asia, Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Turkey (described, for example, in IMF (2001)),
and, to some extent, the Argentinean episode of late 2001, early 2002, have
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1 The opening up and liberalization of financial services in developing countries would yield, in
principle, both static and dynamic gains: static, one-shot efficiency gains from optimally allocating the
available resources (i.e., developed, capital abundant nations would export capital to the developing,
capital scarce ones; also domestically, deeper, more effective financial systems would facilitate the
linkages between domestic savers and investors, reducing information asymmetries and scale
problems), and dynamic ones because the growth rate would be shifted upwards by the increased
capital stock created by the greater investment (temporarily, later adjusting again to the long run
growth trend).2
demonstrated the potential risks associated with financial and capital flows
liberalization.
2
Central Eastern Europe has a somewhat different experience, when compared to
other emerging regions, concerning the financial liberalization process, as the process
there seems to have been much less crisis-prone than in, for instance, Asia or Latin
America. This maybe, at least partially, because the current high degree of external and
financial liberalization in the Central Eastern European countries (CEECs),
3 beyond
questions of economic allocative efficiency, must be understood in terms of the process
of Accession to the European Union.
4
The EU integration process implies legally binding, sweeping liberalization
measures –not only capital account liberalization, but investment by EU firms in the
domestic financial services, and the maintenance of a competitive domestic
environment, giving this financial liberalization process strong external incentives (and
constraints). Those measures were implemented parallel to the development of a highly
sophisticated regulatory and supervisory structure, again based on EU standards. This
whole process happened also with the EU’s technical and financial support, through
specific programs –like the PHARE one, for these so-called Accession, and now
Acceding Countries (ACs), and the TACIS, for the former Soviet Union ones- and
direct assistance from EU institutions, like the European Commission, the European
Parliament and the European Central Bank (also, on a very early stage of the transition
process, the influence of the IMF in setting up policies and institutions in several
                                                
2 A good example of a recent work that supports this cautious line on financial liberalization 
, published by no other organization than the IMF itself, and actually co-authored by
its’ them Chief Economist, Kenneth Rogoff, see Prasad et al., 2003.
3 For capital mobility indicators for the Eastern European countries, in an index from 0 to 100, where
100 indicates full liberalization (see IMF, World Economic Outlook 2000), Estonia and Latvia score
97.6, Lithuania 85.7, the Czech Republic, 73.7, Hungary 59.5, while a “larger” economy like Poland
scores 55.3, Slovenia, 40.5, Bulgaria 35.3, Slovakia, 23.7 and Romania, the less liberalized in the
group, a mere 12.5: the average, non-GDP weighted, is 58.14. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the
index above was computed in 1997 and that now it is certainly higher, especially among the relative
laggards like Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia (but with the possible exception of Romania), given that,
among other things, capital account liberalization is also a (pre)-requisite for EU membership.
4 In March 31, 1998, the European Commission launched official Accession processes with Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (see
Vinhas de Souza at all, 1999). All those Eastern European countries –bar Bulgaria and Romania, for which
the expected date is 2007, plus Cyprus and Malta, shall become members of the European Union in early
May 2004.3
countries in the region –an intervention widely considered to haven been successful-
was very important: see Hallerberg et al., 2002).
Additionally, EU membership in the near future seems to act as an anchor to
market expectations (see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001), limiting the possibilities
of self-fulfilling financial crises and regional contagion (see Linne, 1999), which had
the observed devastating effects in both Asia and Latin America (even a major event,
like the Russian collapse of 1998, had very reduced regional side effects). Several
regional episodes of financial systems’ instability did happen (see Vinhas de Souza,
2002(a) and Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b)), but none with the prolonged negative
consequences observed in other regions (which was also due to the effective national
policy actions undertaken after those episodes).
This study’s main aim is to expand the Kaminsky and Schmukler database (see
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003), from now on indicated as K&S, to include the
Accession and Acceding Countries from Eastern Europe (namely, for Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia). In their original work, K&S build an extensive database of external and
financial liberalization, which includes both developed countries and countries from
emerging regions (but not from Eastern Europe).
5 With that, they create different
indexes of liberalization (capital account, banking and stock markets: see Table I below)
and using them individually and in an aggregate fashion, test for the effects and
causality of this process on financial and real volatility, for the existence of differences
between regions, and for the effects of the ordering of the liberalization process. With
the extended database built in this paper, a similar set of regressions –to enable
comparability- has been run for the CEECs, and the results are contrasted with those for
the other regions included in the K&S original study.
One underlying hypotheses of this work is that the existing regulatory and
institutional framework in Eastern Europe, plus a more sustainable set of macro
policies, played an important role in enabling liberalization to largely deliver the
                                                
5 Namely, their index covers the period 01:1973-06:1999, for the following 28 countries: Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan,
Thailand, and Venezuela (emerging markets) and Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States (mature
economies).4
welfare enhancing outcomes that it is supposed to. Such an “anchoring” role of the
European Union in the CEECs, through the process of EU membership, and through the
effective imposition of international standards of financial supervision and regulation,
may indicate that, beyond multilateral organizations like the IMF or the OECD, a
greater, pro-active regional stabilizing role in emerging markets by regional actors, for
instance, the United States, or by some regional sub-grouping, like Mercosur, may also
be welfare enhancing for other “emerging” regions.
This work is structured as follows: firstly, the individual components of the index
will be described for my sample of countries. Afterwards, the constructed index and its
components will be presented, for the sample as whole and for its individual country
members, and compared with K&S’s original index. In the next section, K&S-
compatible core regressions are run. Afterwards, alternative specifications are









Banks and corporations are
allowed to borrow abroad mostly
freely. They may need to inform
the authorities, but the
authorization is granted almost
automatically. Reserve
requirements might be in place
but are lower than 10%. The
required minimum maturity is not




There are no special exchange
rates for either current account
or capital account transactions.






Banks and corporations are
allowed to borrow abroad,
subject to certain restrictions.
Reserve requirements might be
between 10 and 50%. The
required minimum maturity might
be between two and five years.
There might be caps in
borrowing and certain




There are special exchange
rates for current account and
capital account transactions.





Banks and corporations are
mostly not allowed to borrow
abroad. Reserve requirements
might be higher than 50%. The
required minimum maturity might
be longer than five years. There
might be caps in borrowing and
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rates for current account and
capital account transactions.




There are no controls (ceilings and
floors) on interest rates.
$QG
￿2WKHU￿LQGLFDWRUV
There are likely no credit controls
(subsidies to certain sectors or certain
credit allocations). Deposits in foreign
currencies are likely permitted.
&ULWHULD￿IRU￿3DUWLDO￿/LEHUDOL]DWLRQ
￿/HQGLQJ￿DQG￿ERUURZLQJ￿LQWHUHVW￿UDWHV
There are controls in either lending or
borrowing rates (ceilings or floors).
$QG
￿2WKHU￿LQGLFDWRUV￿
There might be controls in the
allocation of credit controls (subsidies
to certain sectors or certain credit
allocations). Deposits in foreign
currencies might not be permitted.
&ULWHULD￿IRU￿1R￿/LEHUDOL]DWLRQ
￿/HQGLQJ￿DQG￿ERUURZLQJ￿LQWHUHVW￿UDWHV
There are controls in lending rates and
borrowing rates (ceilings and floors).
$QG
￿2WKHU￿LQGLFDWRUV￿
There are likely controls in the
allocation of credit controls (subsidies
to certain sectors or certain credit
allocations). Deposits in foreign
currencies are likely not permitted.
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￿$FTXLVLWLRQ￿E\￿IRUHLJQ￿LQYHVWRUV
Foreign investors are allowed to hold
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Foreign investors are allowed to hold up
to 49 % of each company’s outstanding
equity. There might be restrictions to
participate in certain sectors. There
might be indirect ways to invest in the





Capital, dividends, and interest can be
repatriated, but typically not before two









Capital, dividends, and interest can be
repatriated, but not before five years of
the initial investment.6
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The achieving of capital account liberalization happened rather swiftly in most of the
countries in my sample: by the mid 1990s, all bar Bulgaria and Romania had been
declared Article VIII compliant (for those two countries, this happened in 1998: see
Table II below).
One of the main driving forces behind this was the process of European
Integration, for which external liberalization is a pre-requisite: in the early to mid-
1990s, all the countries had signed Association Agreements with the European Union
(frequently preceded by trade liberalization agreements with the EU, also called
“Europe” trade agreements, usually with years given to the countries to prepare for their
full implementation) and formally applied for EU membership.
Another additional factor supporting liberalization was IMF and OECD
membership: four of the larger countries in my sample became OECD members during
the second half of the 1990s. Another factor to be considered, as will become clear with









Bulgaria -Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed 3/93). A
“Europe” Trade Agreement also signed in 3/93.
-Application for EU membership: 12/95





-(New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (old one
signed in 12/91, new in 10/93). A “Europe”
Trade Agreement since 3/92 (signed in 12/91).
-Application for EU membership: 1/96.
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the
Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, and, since 1/93,





-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95).
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU signed in
7/94.
-Application for EU membership: 11/95.
-IMF entry: 25/5/92. Article
VIII: 15/8/94.
Hungary -Europe Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). A
“Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 (also
signed in 12/91).






-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95).
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU signed in
7/94.
-Application for EU membership: 10/95.
-IMF entry: 19/5/92. Article
VIII: 10/6/94.
Lithuania -Independence: declared in 11/3/90, only
accepted by URSS in 6/9/91.
-Europe Agreement: 2/98 (signed: 6/95).
-Free Trade Agreement with the EU signed in
7/94.
-Application for EU membership: 12/95
-IMF entry: 29/4/92. Article
VIII: 3/5/94.
Poland -Europe Agreement: 2/94 (signed: 12/91). A
“Europe” Trade Agreement since 3/92 (also
signed in 12/91).
-Application for EU membership: 4/94.




Romania -Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed in 2/93). A
“Europe” Trade Agreement (also signed in
2/93).
-Application for EU membership: 6/95
-IMF entry: 15/12/72. Article
VIII: 25/3/1998.
Slovakia -Czechoslovakia break-up: 1/1/93.
-(New) Europe Agreement: 2/95 (signed:
10/93). A Trade Agreement since 3/92 (signed:
12/91).
-Application for EU membership: 6/95
-IMF entry: 20/9/90 (as the
Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, and, since 1/93,





-Europe Agreement: 2/99 (signed 6/96).
-Application for EU membership: 6/96




Financial integration, in the form of the opening up the banking sector to foreign banks,
is seen as being positive, on a micro level, as foreign banks are usually better capitalized
and more efficient than their domestic counterparts (of course, the domestic banking
sector eventually catches-up: for an indication of this process at the ACs, see, among
others, Tomova et al 2003). Also from a macroeconomic perspective, financial
integration maybe positive for the Eastern European countries, both for long run growth
and, as there are indications that foreign banks do not contract either their credit supply
nor their deposit base, in helping to smooth the cycle (see de Haas and Lelyveld, 2003:
they find some indication that this is linked to the better capitalization base and
prudential ratios, as better capitalized domestic banks behave similarly to foreign
banks). Given the bank-centered nature of virtually all the financial systems of the
future Member States, this is particularly important for them.
In most of the future member states, the initial stage of the creation of the two-tier
banking system,
6 modelled on the Western European “universal bank” system,
7 was
characterized by rather liberal licensing practices
8 and limited supervision policies
(aimed at the fast creation of a 	 commercial, private banking sector: see Fleming
et al., 1996, Balyozov, 1999, Enoch et al., 2002, Sörg et al., 2003). This caused a
mushrooming of new banks in those countries in the early 1990s.
Parallel to this, a series of banking crises, of varied proportions, affected most of
those   	 banking systems, due to this lax institutional framework, inherited
fragilities from the command economy period (the political need to support state-
owned, inefficient industries, with the consequent accumulation of bad loans and also
the financing of budget deficits), macroeconomic instability, risky expansion and
                                                
6 In the Baltic states, already in 1987, as part of the Gorbachov reforms, the monobank Gosbak (which
formed the financial system, together with an emissions bank) had spun-off five specialized banks in
all URSS republics (Savings, Agriculture, Social, Industry and Construction, and Foreign Trade: a
somewhat similar specialization was to be found in most other centrally planned economies, with, at
least, a “central bank”, a savings bank and a foreign trade one).
7 Levine (2002), after performing a panel analysis of large number of countries, concludes that either
bank or market-based (i.e., via stock markets) financial systems can be growth-enhancing: what
actually is relevant is the overall development of financial sector and, specially,   
 
	
 (contract enforcement, investor protection, etc.).
8 Sometimes almost comically so: as an example, in the early 1990s, Latvia allowed the creation of a
bank –appropriately called Olympia Bank– just to finance the Latvian Olympic team.9
investment strategies and also sheer inexperience, both from the investors and from
regulators. Progressively, the re-capitalization, privatization and internationalization of
the banking system (mostly into the hands of EU financial conglomerates), coupled with
the implementation of a more robust, EU-modeled institutional framework, did away
with most of those problems.
Two of the worst cases where the set of Baltic banking crises and the Bulgarian
episode, which are described in more detail on Box I below. Other smaller banking
crises happened in Estonia in 1994 and 1998, and in Latvia in 1994. Caprio and
Klingebiel, 2003, report smaller episodes of “financial sector distress” in the Czech
Republic (94-95), Hungary (93), Poland (91-93),
9 Romania (98-00), Slovakia (97) and
Slovenia (92-94).
The initial proliferation of banks was, quite naturally, followed by a process of
consolidation and strengthening –parallel to the privatization of the remnant state-
owned components of the financial system– of the banking sector in most of those
economies (in Bulgaria, from 81 banks in 1992 to 35 in 2001, in the Czech Republic
from 55 in 1995 to 38 in 2001, Estonia, from 42 in 1992 to 7 currently, while Hungary
had 33 banks in 2002, showing only a very slight decrease from the early 1990s,
10
Latvia from 56 in 1994 to 23, Lithuania from 27 in 1993 to 13,
11 in Poland from 81 in
1995 to 71 in 2001,
12 in Romania from 45 in 1998 to 41 in 2001,
13 in Slovakia from 22
in 2000 to 19 in 2001, and in Slovenia, where the number fell from 25 to 21 during
2001 alone
14).
This consolidation process was frequently led by foreign companies, which now
hold the majority of the assets of the banking system in virtually all of them –contrary
to the situation in the current EU Member States– bar Slovenia.
15 This process now has
                                                
9 Reininger et al., 2002, estimate the costs of the re-capitalization programs to have reached 12% of the
GDP for the Czech Republic, 7% for Hungary and 1.4% for Poland, for the late 1990s. Caviglia et al.,
2002, quotes much higher numbers (25%, 13% and 8%), but those figures are for the whole 1990s.
10 Plus 8 credit institutions, and 191 savings and credit cooperatives.
11 Plus 41 credit unions.
12 Plus 642 cooperative banks.
13 Plus 925 credit cooperatives and an astonishing  credit unions.
14 Plus 45 savings and loans institutions.
15 In Bulgaria, around 80% of the assets of the banking system are foreign owned, 95% in the Czech
Republic, 63% in Hungary, 70% in Poland, 55% in Romania, 83% in Slovakia. In the Baltic republics,
around 98% of assets in Estonia, 68% in Latvia, and 87% in Lithuania are foreign owned (see Sörg et
al., 2003, ibid). Especially for Estonia, were 82% of the assets are Swedish-held, this may imply a10
a component of regional expansion of the Eastern European banks themselves, or, more
precisely in most cases, the regional expansion of Western banks via some of their
locally-owned subsidiaries (see Sörg et al., 2003, ibid). The share of banking assets to
GDP, nevertheless, is still far below the Euroarea average (which stood at around 265%
of GDP by end 2001), compared with 47% in Bulgaria, 136% in the Czech Republic,
72% in Estonia and Latvia, 32% in Lithuania, 63% in Poland, 60% in Hungary, 30% in
Romania, 96% in Slovakia and 94% in Slovenia (data also for 2001).
16
Another peculiar feature of the banking system in the region is that foreign
currency lending –usually euro-denominated
17– to  is very high, especially in
the Baltic republics: with 80% of total loans in Estonia, 56% in Latvia and 61% in
Lithuania. Also, the Baltic countries have substantial shares of deposits by non-
residents, with over 10% in Estonia and Lithuania and close to 5% in Latvia (Latvia,
with its close trading ties to Russia, has a particular strategy of selling itself as a stable
financial services center to CIS depositors: see IMF, 2003(b), ibid).
The supervision system has also substantially improved, and, following recent
international  –and EU- best practice, is now centered in independent universal
supervisory agencies in the most advanced of those countries
18 (Reininger et al., 2002,
ibid., estimate that the 
 regulatory environment for the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland is actually above the EU, and that its 
 enforcement level is at its
average; Liive, 2003, gives a description of the Estonian experience that culminated in
the creation of the EFSA –Estonian Financial Supervisory Authority- in January 2002).
                                                                                                                                              
higher likelihood of exposure of its financial system to parent bank country-specific shocks (which also
depends on the degree of diversification of assets of the parent bank: see IMF, 2003(b)). Slovenia is the
“laggard”, with 25.3% of the banking system still state-owned (Romania has the highest share of state-
ownership, with 42%), and only 28% foreign owned –which, nevertheless, was an almost doubling of
the share, just between 2001 and 2002.
16 Part of this financial shallowness is due to the fact that a substantial part of the investment financing
for companies is done via inter-company financing, due to the large share of foreign ownership, and
due to direct commercial financing with non-resident banks. The latter also happens, to smaller degree,
with commercial credit to households (see Reininger 
, 2002, ibid., and Caviglia at al., 2002, ibid.)
17 The potential exposure to currency risk caused by this is somewhat limited by the fact that several of
the ACs –namely, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania– have euro-based currency boards and all of the
ACs are, of course, prospective members of the euro area.
18 Garcia Herrero and Del Rio, 2003, find no significant difference in terms of financial sector stability
between central bank-centered and independent financial supervisory authorities. Schinasi, 2003,





The Baltic bank crises were, to different degrees, linked to liquidity
difficulties related to relations with Russia (in the November 1992 Estonian case, by
the freezing of assets held by some Estonian banks in their former Moscow
headquarters, while the Latvian and Lithuanian episodes of, respectively, March and
December 1995, were caused by the drying-up of lucrative trade-financing
opportunities with Russia, whose export commodities, at that time, were still below
world price levels) and regulatory tightening (Latvia, Lithuania), compounded by the
elimination of credit opportunities with the implementation of the Estonian and
Lithuanian CBAs (Currency Board Arrangements). In Lithuania, as in Bulgaria, the
financing of the budget deficit also played a role. In the Estonian and Latvian cases,
around 40% of the assets of the banking system where compromised, in the
Lithuanian and Bulgarian cases, around a third.
 The Bulgarian 1996-1997 crisis eliminated a third of its banking sector, and
led the country to hyperinflation (reaching over 2000% in March 1997, see Yotzov,
2002). Its roots lie in the political instability that preceded it (which, on its turn, led to
inadequate real sector reform, with state-owned, loss making enterprises being
financed via the budget deficit or through arrears with the, at the time, still mostly
state-owned part banking sector: those arrears were, in turn, partially monetized by
the Bulgarian National Bank –BNB- and the largest state bank, the State Savings
Bank -SSB). Periodic foreign exchange crises (March 1994, February 1997) and bank
runs (late 1995, late 1996, early 1997) were part of this picture. The implementation
of tighter supervisory procedures during 1996 (giving the BNB the power to close
insolvent banks), and a tightening of policy actually led to more bank runs. A
caretaker government in February 1997 (before a newly elected government took
power in May) paved the way to longer lasting reform and the implementation of the
CBA, with its tighter budget constraints towards both the government and the banking




The existence of stock markets is assumed to be beneficial for economic
performance. In principle, it provides a way for companies to raise capital at lower costs
than through simple banking intermediation, and because it is not as restricted a source
of capital as internal financing. Also, it is assumed that the existence of alternative
modes of finance may reduce the likelihood of credit crunches caused by problems with
the banking sector (see Greenspan, 2000). Additionally, the existence of external
ownership is (or was, given the recent problems with market-based governance in the
US and the EU, and the shift towards a more regulated environment) assumed to
provide better governance for the management of firms. The majority of economic
analyses seem to support the position that a diversified financing mix is positive for
economic growth and stability.
As described in the previous section, all the financial sectors in the future Member
States are bank-centered, with stock markets playing marginal roles in most of them
(and, in some, a 	
 role: in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania, their average







Country Date of Creation of Stock Exchange
Bulgaria -5/92: First Stock Exchange begins trading (up to 20 regional ones created); 10/97: The
Bulgarian Stock Exchange-Sofia (resulting from the consolidation of the previous ones)
opened. Stock index available from 1/98
Czech Rep. 4/93: Current Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available from 5/94
Estonia -5/96: Foundation of Tallinn Stock Exchange; 2/02: Merge with Helsinki Stock
Exchange (HEX). Stock index available from 6/96
Hungary -6/90: Stock Exchange (re-) established. Stock index available from 2/91
Latvia -12/93: Stock Exchange established. 8/02: Finnish HEX acquires Riga Stock Exchange
and Depositary. Stock index available from 2/96
Lithuania -9/93: Stock Exchange trading begins. Stock index available from 1/96. 3/04: Finnish
HEX acquires Lithuania National Stock Exchange.
Poland -4/91: Warsaw Stock Exchange re-opened. Stock index available from 5/91
Romania -11/95: Stock Exchange begins to operate. Stock index available from 5/98
Slovakia -4/93: Stock Exchange begins trading. Stock index available from 9/93
Slovenia -12/89: Stock Exchange established. Stock index available from 1/9413
All of these countries had (re-)established stock markets
19 by the mid-90s
20 (see
Table III above). About half of the future Member States used them to drive the initial
process of re-privatisation, either via mass issues of voucher certificates for residents
(the most famous case of this strategy was the Czech Republic), or via IPOs (Initial
Public Offerings) re-privatisation processes,
21 to lock-in domestic and foreign strategic
investors (see Claessens at al., 2000). In the voucher-driven privatization, the initial
large number of investors and traded stocks in those stock markets was soon
concentrated in a rather limited number of institutional investors –domestic and foreign-
and “blue chip” stocks.
22 In the IPO-driven markets, the number of stocks and investors
actually tended to increase with time, albeit from a rather concentrated base.
Even in the largest ones, nevertheless, market capitalisation, as a GDP share, was
and remains rather low (see Figure I below), and far below the EU average (around 72%
of GDP). Only in the Czech Republic, Estonia
23, Hungary and Slovenia the average
market capitalization is above a 20% GDP share, while in Romania is 
 1% in
several years.
24 Also, the average market turnover is equally below the one observed in
comparable EU economies. Similarly to what is observed in the banking sector, the
initial regulatory environment was deliberately lax, and the regulators were plagued by
much the same problems of inexperience and limited number of staff and resources.
25
                                                
19 One must not forget that those were mostly integrated market economies before the disruptions caused
by the Second World War and the posterior Russian occupation: The Warsaw Stock Exchange was
created as early as  !, and the first Prague stock market was created in 1871 (see Bhattacharya and
Baouk, 2002).
20 The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of which Slovenia was a part, combined from early on
elements of a market economy with its command system: its stock market, was, therefore, (re)created
sooner, in 1989.
21 Namely, in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
22 Due to this, Ihnat and Prochazka, 2002, put the 
 Czech equity market capitalization at about 
 of
its apparent GDP share.
23 Estonia, with the highest share, close to 40% of GDP, above even Hungary, an “early reformer”, is an
interesting case, especially when one considers that this was done basically by attracting strategic
foreign investors via IPOs (as indicated above) and 	
–contrary to Latvia and Lithuania– as Estonia is constitutionally required to hold a balanced budget
(see IMF, 2003(b), ibid.). On the other hand, on the Central European economies with larger stocks of
public debt and average public deficits (see Vinhas de Souza and Borbély, 2003), the existence of a
public debt market may have helped those stock markets (see Reininger at el., 2002, ibid).
24 Pogonaru and Apostol, 2002, blame this dismal performance on a failed “voucher” mass privatization
process and on a general policy inconsistency towards reforms.































Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the author.
This does not mean that domestic agents in those countries lack access to the
financial services supposed to be provided by stock markets: the very process of
opening up, the increase in cross-border trade in financial services, the harmonization of
rules for capital trading with the EU (including the ongoing efforts of the Lamfalussy
Committee towards a single European market for securities: according to the current
proposal, small and medium size firms would be able to use a simplified prospectus
valid throughout the EU and choose the country of its approval), plus the development
of information technology, all imply that is not actually necessary –nor economically
optimal, given economies of scale– for each individual country to have its own separate
stock market.
26 One must also recall that the current national stock markets in the
                                                
26 As a matter of fact, three of the stock markets in my sample, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, had their
Stock Exchanges acquired by the Helsinki Stock Exchange –HEX- between 2002 and 2004. The HEX
itself merged with the Swedish Stock Exchange -OM- in May 2003. There are also several overlapping
regional associations and linkages with other EU stock markets, like the i) co-operation between all
Baltic stock exchanges formalized by a memorandum of understanding signed in April 1999, which
quotes a joint list of Baltic companies, ii) the establishment of a joint index of Central European Stock
Exchanges, known as CESI Index, which has been calculated by Budapest Stock Exchange since July
1996 and comprises the most liquid securities from the Bratislava, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw
exchanges, or iii) the NEWEX, established in November 2000 as a joint venture of the Frankfurt and
Vienna Stock Exchanges to list Central Eastern European stocks. The Bulgarian Stock Exchange and
the Athens Stock Exchange also signed a memorandum of understanding in 2001. This actually
mirrors developments among stock markets in the more mature EU markets, like the merger of the
Belgian, Dutch, French and Portuguese national stock exchanges that resulted in the creation of the15
mature developed economies are themselves the result of process of consolidation –and
closing- of smaller 
 stock markets (as was observed in Bulgaria in the early
1990s), which still today coexist with larger, dominant national stock exchanges even in
some mature markets, like Germany and the US.
Nevertheless, the observed tendency of  larger companies, with presumed
better growth prospects, to list abroad (see Table IV below), due to the obvious cost
27
and liquidity advantages of the larger international stock markets, does seems, on
balance,
28 to deprive those stock markets of liquidity (see Claessens at al., 2003). On the
other hand, non-residents seem to play a major role in most of those markets
(accounting for 77% of the capitalization in Estonia, 70% in Hungary and half of the
"
 capitalization in Lithuania).
                                                                                                                                              
EURONEXT, the HEX-OM merger and the NOREX, the loose association the Scandinavian stock
exchanges.
27 Domowitz et al., 2000, estimates that the total trading costs in the Stock Markets of Budapest and
Prague were  higher than the ones observed in Germany and the US.
28 On the other hand, a foreign listing may also increase domestic trading, if this foreign listing is
perceived by domestic investors a sign of quality of a particular stock. Also, foreign stock trading may,
























Bulgaria N.A N.A N.A N.A 30*
Czech Republic 98.90 11.8 40 36 111
Ρ
Estonia 95.30 84.7 8 44.4 18
Hungary 99.80 14.6 52 74.3 70
Latvia 0.30 0.6 2 12.5 16
Lithuania 42.40 337.3 5 11.4 44
§
Poland 81.30 62.5 30 12.2 246
Ν
Romania N.A N.A N.A N.A 63
Slovakia 76.20 N.A 6 23.1 26
Slovenia 7.00 5.9 2 1 189
Average 62.60 73.9 14.5 26.9 81.3
Source: Claessens at al., 2003, modified by the author; *In the “Official Market”, in the “Free Market” for
small caps, another 372 (in 2001); 
ΡIt is estimated that only 15 shares are actively traded; 
§In the “Official
Market” only # companies are listed; 
ΝDue to legal reasons, major foreign-owned banks are forced to
list on the Warsaw Stock Exchange: they are believed to be responsible for a full third of the market
capitalization, while 90% of the “free float” is done by just 20 stocks.
All the specific questions described above concerning the way those stock
exchanges were founded and their later developments, plus their relative smallness and
shallowness, affect the dynamics of their stock market indexes (SMI),
29 and are clearly
reflected by them (as one may see in Figure II, below). This, coupled with the rather
limited duration of the series, may affect their adequacy as proxies of financial cycles,
as one will see on Section 7.
                                                
29 Reininger et al., 2002, ibid., estimate that for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 	stocks are










































Bulgaria  Czech Republic  Estonia  Hungary 
Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania 
Slovakia  Slovenia 
Source: Datastream, modified by the author. The price indexes here were converted to US Dollars
and re-based to a common reference period were they equal 100, May of 1998. The country codings are





The construction of the index for this new sample of countries was the core of this
work. A comprehensive effort was done to crosscheck the information collected from
papers and publications with national sources.
30 Below I present the estimated monthly
index, for the period January 1990 to June 2003 (see Figure III). The base data for its
construction was collected from IMF and EBRD publications, then exhaustively
verified both with national sources and with works written about the individual
countries and the region. This is an index that falls with liberalization, where maximum
liberalization equals  and minimum  (in this sense, one could actually see it as
an index of financial ). As an additional robustness check, the year-end value
                                                
30 The author would like to thank the Austrian National Bank (Jarko Fidrmuc), Bank of Bulgaria
(Nikolay Nenovsky), Czech National Bank (Vit Barta and Michal Slavik), Bank of Estonia (Raoul
Lättemäe), National Bank of Hungary (Ágnes Csermely and Zoltán Szalai), Bank of Latvia (Zoja
Medvedevskiha and Martins Prusis), Bank of Lithuania (Violeta Klyviene), Bank of Poland (Mariusz
Jarmuzek), Bank of Romania (Dorina Antohi), National Bank of Slovakia (Juraj Janosik), Bank of
Slovenia (Janko Tratnik and Karmen Juren), Bratislava Stock Exchange (Andrea Hippova and Monika
Zabadalova), Budapest Stock Exchange, Ljubljana Stock Exchange (Barbara Meza), Prague Stock
Exchange (Eva Hoskovcová), Riga Stock Exchange (Inese Purgaile), Sofia Stock Exchange (Pantaley
Karasimeonov), Tallinn Stock Exchange (Sandra Meigas), National Stock Exchange of Lithuania
(Arminta Saladziene), Warsaw Stock Exchange (Monika Matlak) for their help in the construction of
the liberalization index used here.18
of the index here constructed was regressed on the combined EBRD’s yearly indexes of
banking sector reform and non-banking financial sector reform. The results from a panel
regression with the index constructed here on the LHS and the EBRD index on the RHS
yield a coefficient of .60, and correlations among the individual country-specific index



























As one may see from Figure III above, the process of integration and
liberalization was almost continuous throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The spikes
in the “Full Liberalization Index” in the early 1990s do not indicate reversals: the
merely reflect the entry into the sample of they newly independent Baltic republics. As
former members of the Soviet Union, they “enter” the world as highly closed
economies, but those countries introduced liberalization reforms almost immediately
from the start. After this, a slight increasing trend, that does reflect a mild liberalization
reversal, is observed, starting mid-1994 and lasting 
 early 1997, from when a
continuous liberalization trend is observed: this reversal will be explained below.
Noteworthy here is the fact that 	

 of the obvious candidates for a reversal
of liberalization (the 1997 Asian Crisis, the collapse of the Czech monetary arrangement
in 1997, the collapse of the Bulgarian monetary arrangement in 1996/97, the 1998
Russian Crisis, the 1999-2001 oil price shocks –as all those economies are highly19
dependent of imported energy sources) seems to have driven these mild liberalization
reversals.
Comparing the Full Index constructed here with the one constructed by K&S, for
similar time samples, one may observe that the ACs start substantially below the
average level of other emerging markets –i.e., they are  liberalized, but both the
“entry” of the initially less liberalized former Soviet republics, plus continuous
liberalization efforts in the emerging market K&S set reverse this situation. A similar
liberalization reversal trend in both the ACs and the merging market set is observed
from early 1994, but it is actually slightly stronger on the ACs sample, until its reversal
in 1996. By the end of my sample, the ACs are clearly below the final value for the
emerging set in K&S’s sample. This sort of remarkably fast pattern of the ACs’ “leap-
froging” towards best international practice is also observed in several types of
institutional frameworks, like, for instance, monetary policy institutions and instruments
(see Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001): a process that virtually took decades for
Western central banks was compressed in a half a dozen years in the Future Member
States. Nevertheless, by the end of the sample, both emerging and ACs are still above




















































































Analyzing the individual components of the index (see Figure V next page), one
may see that, abstracting again from the initial spikes in the index, which are, as20
explained above, caused by the addition of new countries to the sample, the 1994/1997
reversal of liberalization was essentially driven by the $
% liberalization
component. As will become clear with the country specific analysis below, this was
related, in most cases, to –and here it must be stressed that those were rather limited



























Average-Capital Account Liberalization Average-Financial Sector Liberalization
Average-Stock Market Liberalization
Comparing now the individual components of the Full Index constructed here
with the ones from K&S, again for emerging and mature economies, it becomes clear
that the reversals observed in Figure IV were driven by different sources in the
emerging set (increase in capital account restrictions) and ACs set (financial sector): see




















































































ACs-Domestic Financial Sector ACs-Capital Account Liberalization
ACs-Stock Market Emerging-Domestic Financial Sector
Emerging-Capital Account Liberalization Emerging-Stock Market
Developed-Domestic Financial Sector Developed-Capital Account Liberalization
Developed-Stock Market
One could, in principle, aggregate the countries in my sample in three different
groups: rapid liberalizers (the ones that followed a “big bang” early approach, without
major reversals: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), consistent liberalizers (the ones
that followed a more delayed path, but also without major roll backs: the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland) and cautious liberalizers (the ones whose liberalization path






Average Index Initial Value of Index Final Value of Index
Bulgaria 1.17 2.37 1.00
Czech Republic 1.21 1.30 1.00
Estonia 1.53 3.00 1.00
Hungary 1.81 2.47 1.00
Latvia 1.21 3.00 1.00
Lithuania 1.35 3.00 1.20
Poland 1.68 2.30 1.53
Romania 2.05 2.83 1.60
Slovakia 1.93 2.40 1.30




The financial cycle coding which is used by K&S defines cycles as a at least twelve
month-long strictly downwards (upwards) movement, followed by an equally upwards
(downwards) 12-month movement from the through (peak) of #,
measured in USD, as they should reflect returns from the point of view of an
international investor. As described in the stock market section of this work, one must
be warned that there are specific factors in the countries in my sample that may affect
the effectiveness of a stock market index as an adequate proxy of financial cycles, at
least for the sample here considered. Beyond that, these series have a rather limited time
extension (my sample covers the 01:1990-06:2003 period).
31 As an alternative to K&S
criteria, I use the Bry and Boschan (1971) developed a nonparametric algorithm
determine turning points (see the Annex). With this procedure I find 45 cycles, 22
upward and 23 downward, in all countries but Romania.
                                                
31 Questions concerning the adequacy of this measure are not restricted to emerging markets: for
instance, after the end of the longest recorded continuous expansion and the “bursting of the bubble” in
the US in 2000, the Dow Jones index lost over 3000 points between January 2000 and December 2002
(conveniently after the end of K&S’s sample), or over a full quarter of its value, without any changes
in financial liberalization in the US. Other major stock indexes suffered even greater –and almost
continuous– losses: in a similar time period, the UK’s FTSE-100 fell from over 6750 to below 3500,
while the German DAX fell from over 7500 to below 2500, also without changes in liberalization.23








       & 
 ε λ β ρ α + + + + = (1)
where the variable 
 is two series with the amplitudes of the downwards or
upwards movement of a stock market index, calculated as the depth of the contraction
(height of the expansion). Following K&S, this is estimated as the change between peak
(trough) and the following trough (peak) of the cycle identified as above, and them as a
percentage of the average value observed during this cycle for country . &L is a matrix
of control variables (which includes the world real interest rate –here defined as the US
Prime Lending Rate minus the CPI inflation in time , world output growth, here
represented by a linear combination of the monthly log industrial production series for
the US, Germany and Japan, and domestic output growth, here proxied by the monthly
log industrial production series for each country) with their average value during the
cycle, while 

  is a dummy variable that equals one if the cycle occurs during “non-
liberalized” periods, while 

  is the “short-run” dummy that equals one if the cycle
occurs shortly after liberalization, and while 


  is a “long-run” dummy that equals one
if the cycle occurs a longer time after liberalization.
32
Again, one must be warned about some features concerning the industrial
production indexes for this sample of countries: beyond their short time span, they are
affected by the so-called “transition” recession: the 
 pattern of post-reform growth
of a transition economy is characterized by a sharp initial fall followed by recovery and
growth.
33 The opening-up and the onset of market prices made some sectors
uncompetitive virtually overnight. This, coupled with the traditional “over-
industrialization” of the former centrally-planned economies, plus the early collapse of
their Eastward-biased trade linkages had substantial effects on the level and
                                                
32 K&S use the –admittedly arbitrary– windows of 48 months and 60 months (4 and 5 years) to
characterize their short and long runs. They state that their results are robust to the change in
dimension of those “windows”. As the aim of this work is to extend theirs, I use the same short and
long run windows.
33 For a stylized description of this general post-transition “U-shaped” growth trajectory (with some
exceptions, like Belarus), see Havrylyshyn et al., 1998, Fischer and Sahay, 2000 and Bakanova et al.,
2004. Most of the ACs had reached their “pre-transition” GDP levels –and some surpassed them- by
the early 2000s.24
composition of their industrial output (in Lithuania, the most extreme case in my
sample, for instance, the industrial production index lost almost 70% of its original































































































ource: Datastream and National Statistical Offices, modified by the author.
9)' 
With the provisos above, I perform a heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS estimation. The
results are show in Table VI below
34. As one may see, the R
2 is relatively low, there
signs of heteroskedasticity, world output is significant in upward cycles with a positive
sign, while the other variables in the control set are non-significant, and all have rather
small point estimates
35. Concentrating on the coefficients of main interest to this
analysis, the financial repression variable (here represented by a dummy that equals one
in periods without partial or full liberalization, defined as above, and zero otherwise) is
significant in upward cycles, as are the short and long run dummies. Financial
                                                
34 Those results are from regressions after the correction of three “outliers” detected after the inspection
of the residuals of a regression with all observations (corresponding to one Polish upward and one
Polish downward cycles, almost right at the beginning of the sample, and to a Latvian upward cycle
during the height of the “Asian Crisis”). The elimination of these three “outliers” almost 
 the
R
2 of the regressions, 
	 its standard error and improves significantly the Durbin-Watson statistic,
but without changing 
	
 the significance or sign of the variables. '	
, the
estimated value of the duration increase of the upwards cycles and of the decrease of the downward
cycles post-liberalization falls substantially.
35 The usage of a German “world” real interest rate makes this variable positive significant with a
substantially larger point estimate, but in the “upward” cycle regressions only, and without affecting
significantly the other variables.25
liberalization increases the amplitude of upward cycles by around 5.6% in the short
run
36 (the K&S estimate for emerging markets is 37%, and 51% in mature ones) and by
9.4% in the long run, when compared to the period of financial repression (the K&S
estimate for emerging markets is a long run  of 25%, and of 10% in mature
ones)
37. On the other hand, crashes decrease with liberalization by 15% in the short run
(in K&S, crashes in emerging markets  their amplitude by 28% in the short run,
and decrease by 20% in mature markets), and by 25% in the long run (in K&S, crashes
decrease by 12% in emerging markets and by 43% in mature markets in the long run),
albeit the coefficients are not significant for the downward cycles.

9)
Included observations: 22 (up) 23 (down) Upward Cycle Downward Cycle
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
World Real Interest Rate 0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.02
World Output -0.03* 0.00 -0.00 0.01
Domestic Output 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial Repression Dummy 2.33*** 1.25 0.68 0.81
Short Run Liberalization Dummy 2.46*** 1.39 0.58 0.91
Long Run Liberalization Dummy 2.55*** 1.36 0.51 0.88
Constant now show. * and *** indicate
significance at the 1% and 10% levels,
respectively. R
2: 0.35 DW: 1.36 R
2: 0.26 DW: 1.48
Bearing in mind the limited number of observation, and the fact that the series
were buffeted by country specific (for instance, “transition” itself, which happened in
different moments for different countries, the banking crises described above) and
common shocks (the Asian, Russian and oil price shocks), which affect the significance
of the results, one can preliminarily state that there are some signs that the K&S
inference that financial liberalization has short run costs for emerging markets is not
observed in my ACs sample.
                                                
36 This value corresponds to the percentage increase of the coefficient “Short Run Liberalization
Dummy” when compared with the coefficient “Financial Repression Dummy”, and similarly to the
“Long Run Liberalization Dummy”.
37 Edwards et al., 2003, confirms those significant “excess returns” emerging markets when compared to




The institutional underpinnings of the liberalization process are essential to the analysis
performed here, as one of the aims of this work is to test if the EU institutional
framework imposed by the Accession process is what enabled them to derive the
previous welfare-enhancing results from liberalization. K&S, in their work, represent
the  “quality of institutions” via a dummy series based on the monthly ICRG
(International Country Risk Guide) “Law and Order” index, which assumes a value of
one if the index is growing or at its maximum (the ICRG index itself has a maximum
value of six, with three granted to the “law” component and three to the “order” one).
K&S also use information on insider trading laws and enforcement, taken from
Bhattacharya and Baouk, ibid, 2002. This work uses also the ICRG index, but not the
data from Bhattacharya and Baouk, as the information in that paper doesn’t fit neither
the knowledge of this author concerning the level of legal enforcement in the sample of
countries here used, nor with the conclusions of works like Reininger et al., 2002, ibid.











         & 
 ε τ λ β α + + + + + =
(2)
where the new variable 
+ ) *   is the dummy based on the ICRG Law and Order index.
The results are show on Table VII below. They do not change qualitatively or
quantitatively and the new “Law and Order” dummy is only in upward cycles, but with
a peculiar, albeit small, negative sign (i.e., it reduces expansions).27

>)
Included observations: 22 (up) 23
(down) Upward Cycle Downward Cycle
Variables Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
World Real Interest Rate 0.06*** 0.03 -0.04 0.03
World Output -0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Domestic Output 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial Repression Dummy 3.08** 1.17 0.87 1.32
Short Run Liberalization Dummy 3.36** 1.31 0.76 1.37
Long Run Liberalization Dummy 3.25** 0.62 0.69 1.33
Law and Order Dummy -0.25*** 0.06 -0.28 0.78
Constant not show; ** and **
indicate
significance at the 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. R
2: 0.45 DW: 1.32 R
2: 0.27 DW: 1.46
To specifically verify the hypothesis that the EU integration process was the main
force driving the liberalization process, the same regression as on section 6.1 was run
with dummies for the periods after i) the Europe Association Agreements were signed
(EUts), ii) the date of official application for EU membership (EUa) and iii) the date in
which they entered into force (EUt). The results are rather similar to the previous ones:
upwards cycles significantly increase with liberalization and downward cycles decrease
in the short run (albeit with somewhat stronger estimated effects, specially for the EUt
dummy regression), but they are only significant for the upward cycles on the
regressions using a dummy for the date of official application for EU membership: it
significantly  them. Those are perhaps intuitive results, as one would expect
some of the effects of the EU and Law and Order dummies to be captured by the
liberalization dummies, but the assumption concerning the importance of the EU






Given the potential shortcomings of the previous analysis, which are derived both
from limitations oF the original K&S framework and from the specific features of my28
dataset, a set of alternative specifications was also estimated. Namely, other measures of
	

, both financial, real and nominal, were used as the LHS of the regressions
below, namely, the standard deviation of i) the stock market index, ii) the industrial
production index and iii) the changes in the nominal exchange rate, in rolling variance
time-windows of 2 to 6 months (following Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c)), as
given by (3) below. The basic notion behind this is that liberalization and integration
will affect, and in a more fundamental fashion, not just the cyclical, but also the overall
real and nominal volatility of a given economy, albeit in a not unambiguous fashion (for
instance, if financial integration leads to increased specialization, it could increase
country-specific shocks: see Razin and Rose, 1994).
     ,  & 	

 ε α + + = (3)
Now the XL matrix of control variables includes, beyond the world real interest
rate, world output growth, domestic output growth, a domestic nominal exchange rate
index (re-based to May 1998, as the other indexes), the level of the S&P 500 equity
index (equally re-based to May 1998), the domestic stock market indexes, dummies for
a float exchange rate regime, a hard peg regime, a sliding peg regime for the specific
country/period per regime (following Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c), ibid) and,
finally, the variable L, for “index”, which is either the full Liberalization Index or its
three components. As the index is better seen as a measure of financial restriction, a
positive sign will indicate that an increase in liberalization reduces volatility. The results
for the 6-months variance window using the full sample, the most robust ones, are
shown in Table VIII below (those results are from a fixed effects -deemed superior to a
random effects one after a Hausman test- heteroskedasticity-consistent estimation)
39.
                                                                                                                                              
38 Using together the “Law and Order” and EU dummies, these results remain mostly unchanged.
39 The variables for world real interest rate, world output growth and the level of the S&P 500 equity
index were replaced in the control set by the German real interest rate, the German Industrial
production index and the DAX index. The results for those variables were almost always non





















Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
World Real Interest Rate 0.0003 0.0002 0.02 0.02 0.003 0.00005
World Output Index -0.004* -0.004* 0.02 0.01 0.10* 0.1*
Domestic Output Index -0.0004* -0.0004* 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.005***
Nominal Exchange Rate
Index
0.00005 0.00001 0.002 0.02 -0.001 0.00001
Standard and Poor Index 0.01*** 0.01** -2.11** -2.02** 0.42 0.53
Domestic Stock Market
Index
0.04* 0.05* 2.13** 2.55* -1.21* -0.83*
Float Dummy -0.005 0.01** 1.86* 1.56** -3.12* -2.87*
Hard Peg Dummy -0.04* -0.01 2.38* 2.48** -3.75* -3.09*
Sliding Peg Dummy -0.02* -0.0002 1.76* 1.78** -3.32* -2.92*
Full Liberalization Index -0.01* _ -1.31** - -0.38 -
Capital Account
Liberalization
_ 0.05* _ 1.59** _ 1.83*
Stock Market
Liberalization
_ -0.03* _ -0.66*** _ -0.75*
Financial Sector
Liberalization
_ -0.02* _ -2.03* _ -0.91*
Constant and country
terms not show; *, ** and
*** indicates significance








As one might see, the R
2s are similar to the ones on the previous regressions, the
coefficients of the “control set” are rather small, but mostly significant (in a result
similar to Vinhas de Souza, 2002(b) and 2002(c), almost all exchange rate frameworks
significantly reduce the volatility of the stock market and nominal exchange rate
variables, but increase the one of the industrial production series). Concentrating the
analysis on the liberalization index variables, the full index significantly  the
volatility of both the stock market and the industrial production index, but the point30
estimate is only truly substantial for the industrial production series
40. When the index is
disaggregated on its components, one may see that the variability reducing effects are
driven by capital account liberalization component, which has the highest point estimate
of all components (bar the financial sector liberalization component on the industrial
production regression), while the stock market and the financial sector components
significantly increases volatility. These results tend to remain the same using a post-
1996 sample. The main changes are that, beyond the one described on footnote 41, the
stock market and the financial sector components become non-significantly on the stock
market regression.







the other coefficients broadly unaffected. Peculiarly, when one uses the Law & Order
dummy, it is non-significant on the industrial production regressions, increases
volatility significantly on the stock market ones and reduces it significantly on the
exchange rate ones, while rendering the liberalization index (full and components)
insignificant on the industrial production and exchange rate estimations. When this is
used together with the EU dummies, these results remain, but only the EUt and EUa
dummies are 
 significant, perhaps indicating the somewhat delayed effects of the
Accession process on the legal framework and enforcement.
                                                
40 This is very likely related to the “transition recession” adjustment. A short sample estimation that starts











 Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
World Real Interest Rate -0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0012* -0.0011**
World Output Index -0.0016* -0.0016* -0.0017** -0.0017**
Domestic Output Index -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
Nominal Exchange Rate Index 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001**
Standard and Poor Index 0.0159*** 0.0167** 0.0219*** 0.0226**
Domestic Stock Market Index 0.0274* 0.0258* 0.0357* 0.0337*
Float Dummy 0.0164** 0.0075 0.0154 0.0065
Hard Peg Dummy 0.0267** 0.0191 0.0248 0.0168
Sliding Peg Dummy 0.0091** 0.0002 0.0072 -0.0018
Full Liberalization Index 0.0008 _ -0.0006 _
Capital Account Liberalization _ -0.0111 _ -0.0131
Stock Market Liberalization _ 0.0121** _ 0.0119
Financial Sector Liberalization _ -0.0082 _ -0.0074
Constant and country terms
not show; *, ** and *** indicates
significance at the 1%, 5% and





From a more theoretical point of view, financial liberalization and integration
should also enable a reduction of the volatility of consumption, as it would allow better
international risk-sharing opportunities (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1998). Given that, I
also estimated the regression above using three quarters standard deviation series of
consumption --both private and total, i.e., including government consumption
expenditures- as a GDP share as the dependent variable. As this data is available only
on a quarterly basis and for shorter time samples, the number of observations is
substantially reduced. The results are on Table IX above. As one might see, the R
2s are
again somewhat small and now also all the point estimates are rather small. More
importantly, all the liberalization index variables are now non-significant, with the
exception of the stock market liberalization component, which significantly decreases
volatility
41. The EU dummies are equally non-significant (bar the EUts dummy on the
                                                
41 Kose et al., 2003, and Prasad et al., 2003, obtains somewhat comparable results, concerning their MFI
(more financially integrated) sample of emerging markets.32
total consumption regressions) and these results remain the same using a post-1996
sample.
All the regressions in this section were also estimated with squared terms for the
liberalization indexes, to try to capture eventual non-linear effects of a liberalization
process (or “threshold” effects, like the ones found in Kose et al., 2003). The changes
on the coefficients are mostly marginal.
Another robustness test was to estimate all the regressions on this section using
different time samples, to test for the stability of the coefficients across time (roughly,
using the first and later halves of the sample) and here, as one should expect, given the
initial instability of the time series, one does observes some significant differences.
Concentrating on the index variables, for the stock market index, when using the
aggregate index the sign and significance are roughly the same for the later part of the
sample, but the coefficient is three times larger in the earlier sample, and when using the
disaggregate indexes, all the components are non-significant in later sample, and again
have much larger point estimates in the earlier sample, but with same signs and
significance as in the initial estimations presented in this section (one may see this as an
indication that liberalization was more important in the initial set-up phase of those
stock markets); for the industrial production index, when using the aggregate index, the
variable is non-significant for the later part of the sample, but the coefficient is again
much larger in the earlier sample (which may be seen as an indication that liberalization
was most important early in the process, when industrial re-structuring took place), and
when using the disaggregate index, the sign, scale and significance of the coefficients
remain roughly the same in the later sample, but in the earlier sample only the FSL
component is significant, with a larger point estimate; for the changes in the nominal
exchange rate, neither the aggregate index nor the disaggregate indexes are significant
in the earlier sample, while in the later sample  the aggregate and disaggregate
indexes are now significant, with the same signs but larger point estimates (perhaps an
indication that the liberalization process only affected exchange rates after a certain
degree of macro stabilization was achieved); for private and total consumption, one
does not observe major changes between the two time samples. All the results above
remain roughly unchanged using both those two different time samples  squared33
terms for the liberalization indexes, another indication that the time variance observed
in the series dominates the results.
@         
The main aim of this paper was to extend the index developed by Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2003, for a specific sample of countries, namely, the previously centrally
planned economies from Central and Eastern Europe that are candidate countries for
membership in the European Union, and to perform a similar analysis on them.
My results lend only weak support to the basic assumption of this study: a re-
estimation of K&S’s core regressions, using cycles defined by a Bry-Boschan algorithm
that finds cyclical turning points, finds some signs that financial liberalization does
generate benefits both in the short and in the long run, measured via the statistically
significant extension of the amplitude of upward cycles and its –statistically non-
significant- reduction for downward cycles of stock market indexes. Some of those
weaknesses are likely related to the shortness and specific features of the sample of
countries here used. Importantly, these estimated results diverge from K&S, as in their
work “emerging markets” experience a relative  increase in the amplitude of
downward cycles.
Another noteworthy feature is that only minor liberalization reversals, led by the
financial sector component, were observed in the aggregate index. Also, those reversals
do not seem to be driven by “contagion” from shocks in other emerging markets (like
the Asian or Russian crisis), but reflect country-specific shocks. When considering the
individual components of the index separately, again signs of minor reversals in
financial sector liberalization are observed, related to temporary reactions to the several
banking crisis observed in the region.
Concerning the importance of institutions and of the EU Accession, this paper’s
initial assumption was that the mostly positive results above would come about due to
the anchoring of expectation provided by the perspective of entry into the EU already by
mid-2004 (or 2007, in the case of Bulgaria and Romania) for the countries here
analyzed, and by the imposition of a more robust macro and institutional framework by
the requirements of the Accession process itself. Strong signs of this are  found in34
the K&S regressions, perhaps because the liberalization index itself captures the effects
of the EU Accession process.
Finally, using a different framework than K&S’s to assess the affects of
liberalization on financial, real and nominal volatility, most of the econometric results




 is the element that most consistently and significantly reduces volatility.
One also observes significant time-varying effects on the coefficients, as one should
expect, given the nature of the series used, but no non-linear effects of liberalization. On
this final section, the majority the econometric results seem to support  specific





Bry and Boschan (1971, ibid) developed a nonparametric algorithm to find peaks and
troughs (i.e., “turning points”) in individual time series. Their procedure consists of six
consecutive steps. First, outliers are identified and replaced by corrected values. Second,
troughs (peaks) are determined, from a 12-month moving average of the original series,
for observations whose values are lower (higher) than those of the 5 preceding and the 5
following months. In case two or more consecutive troughs (peaks) are found, only the
lowest (highest) is retained. Third, after computing a weighted moving average (a so-
called “Spencer curve”), the highest and lowest points on this curve, within the +/-5
months-neighborhood of the previously determined peaks and troughs, are selected.
Fourth, the same procedure is repeated using a short-term moving average, with a
number of lags included depending on a MCD (“months of cyclical dominance”:
following Bry and Boschan, 1971, ibid, the MCD is the “number of months required for
the systematic trend-cycle forces to assert themselves against the irregular time series
component”, p. 25) measure. Finally, in the neighborhood of these intermediate turning
points, troughs and peaks are determined (obviously, in the time series modified as
described above, not in the original ones).
A MATLAB program originally created by Mönch and Uhlig (2004) that finds
such business cycle turning points according to the BB (Bry-Boschan) algorithm was35
used in this paper. This program leaves out two features of the original procedure,
namely the adjustment for outliers in the original time series and a priori choice of the
MCD measure, set to 3. The results for the countries in my sample (all but Romania, for
who the procedure did not identified any cycles, using a minimum cycle-phase length of
5 months) are show in the figures below: the red dot represents the peak of the upward
cycle (average duration: 19.3 months), the green one the through of the downward one
(average duration: 21.1 months). One must note that the BB procedure is statistically
demanding for such short series, and the fact that it effectively eliminates the early and
final sections of the sample from the cyclical turning points’ calculation makes the
usable parts of the series even shorter.
As a side remark, the usage of this BB procedure on IPI series of the countries
above, to proxy for GDP, as Mönch and Uhlig (2004, ibid) do for the euro area, shows
that only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia –exactly the economies found by
more traditional correlation studies (see, for instance. Vinhas de Souza et al., 1999) to have
greater GDP synchronization with the EU/euro area - have cycles within similar timeframe
–i.e., peak in February 1992, through in January 1993- as the one complete cycle found for
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